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SCHELERIAN FUNDAMENTALS OF 
LOGOTHERAPY
Fundamentos Schelerianos da Logoterapía
Fundamentos Schelerianos de la Logoterapía
Abstract: Viktor Frankl’s Logotherapy is based on Max Scheler’s theory of values and an-
thropology. Frankl builds his psychological thinking based on critical concepts of Scheleri-
an thinking such as (i) value and goods, (ii) will and feelings, (iii) the hierarchy of values, and 
(iv) the idea of person. It is with them that he develops his original theses of (i) the spiritual 
motivation of human action, (ii) the search for meaning and (iii) the spiritual unconscious. 
In doing so, he offered not only a psychotherapy of values, but also a new theory of positive 
human motivation, not conceived as a result of deficiency or need, but as a result of the free 
spirit toward objective values. The human search for meaning in life can only be successful 
by living and realizing superior values, in the hierarchical sense proposed by Scheler.
Keywords: Frankl, Scheler, logotherapy, existential analyses, value, meaning of life. 
Resumen: La Logoterapia propuesta por Viktor Frankl se basa en la teoría de los valores y 
antropología de Max Scheler. Frankl construye su pensamiento psicológico basado en con-
ceptos clave del pensamiento Scheleriano como (i) valor y bienes, (ii) voluntad y sentimien-
tos, (iii) la jerarquía de valores y (iv) la idea de persona. Es con ellos que desarrolla sus tesis 
originales de (i) la motivación espiritual de la acción humana, (ii) la búsqueda de significado 
y (iii) el inconsciente espiritual. Al hacerlo, ofreció no solo una psicoterapia de valores, sino 
también una nueva teoría de la motivación humana positiva, no concebida como resulta-
do de la discapacidad o la necesidad, sino del espíritu libre dirigido a valores objetivos. La 
búsqueda humana de sentido en la vida solo es posible tener éxito con la experiencia y la 
realización de valores superiores, en el sentido jerárquico propuesto por Scheler.
Palabras-Clave: Frankl, Scheler, logoterapia, análisis existencial, valor, sentido de la vida. 
Resumo: A Logoterapia proposta por Viktor Frankl está fundamentada na teoria dos va-
lores e antropologia de Max Scheler. Frankl constrói seu pensamento psicológico baseado 
em conceitos-chave do pensamento scheleriano como (i) o valor e os bens, (ii) o querer e os 
sentimentos, (iii) a hierarquia de valores e (iv) a ideia de pessoa. É com eles que desenvolve 
suas teses originais da (i) motivação espiritual da ação humana, (ii) busca de sentido e (iii) 
inconsciente espiritual. Ao fazê-lo, ofereceu não só uma psicoterapia dos valores, mas tam-
bém uma nova teoria da motivação humana positiva, não concebida como fruto de defici-
ência ou necessidade, mas do espírito livre direcionado a valores objetivos. A busca humana 
por sentido na vida só é possível ser bem-sucedida com a vivência e realização de valores 
superiores, no sentido hierárquico proposto por Scheler. 
Palavras-chave: Frankl, Scheler, logoterapia, análise existencial, valor, sentido da vida.
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Introduction 
Viktor Emil Frankl was one of the most important psychologists of the 20th century. His work, 
known by the centrality given to the concept of ‘meaning of life’, remains influential to this day. The psy-
chotherapeutic practise that he developed, Existential Analysis or Logotherapy, continues to be adopted, 
in a pure sense or through some of its principles and techniques incorporated into Cognitive Therapy. 
His best-known work, Man's search for meaning, is often considered one of the most important of the 20th 
century1 or even ever written2, and it has been on the list of best-selling books in the world for years3. 
What little is known, however, is how much his psychological approach is due to Max Scheler's theory of 
values  and anthropology, a prominent phenomenologist and moral philosopher. This philosopher's theory 
of values  offered the philosophical basis on which Frankl built his psychological and psychotherapeutic 
theory and practice, which constitutes an authentic ‘psychology of values’. 
We intend in this article to make evident that Logotherapy is indebted to Max Scheler's theory of 
values  and anthropology (Domínguez, 2011). Then, we will highlight the innovation of the concepts of 
motivation, search for meaning and spiritual unconsciousness present in Viktor Frankl's Logotherapy, 
explaining it as true Schelerian psychology.
1. Scheler and the Value  
The idea of  ‘value’ is central to Scheler's work. Just as things have their essences that determine what 
they are, they also bear values. The difference is that the essence is a quality or characteristic that defines 
things; it is its invariant nucleus, the identity that remains, an ideal unit, the quid (HUA XIX/1). The value 
is born by the object, or the object holds up the value. The objects that support values  are called ‘goods’ 
(Scheler, 2001). For Scheler, ‘value’ is a primitive concept, more basic than the concept of ‘good’. ‘Good’ is 
something that supports value, not the other way around.
For Scheler, other properties of values include objectivity (value is not a product of the subject, it 
is discovered by it), immutability (value does not change, if an object changes its value, it is because it 
acquired another), apriority (its hierarchy is independent of experience, universal and necessary), mate-
riality (they have a content, they are not formal principles that set relationships between objects) and are 
apprehended by experience through feeling, not reason.
Values are objective qualities that arise from the experience of goods. They are autonomous and 
independent. They are not a creation of the subject or an accident of the object. Values are universals man-
ifested in the world, in goods, and human beings can intuit them, emotionally perceive their objectivity. 
Thus, values and their connections are not to be confused with empirical objects and situations. They are 
qualities that accompany goods linked to their essence. For example, music supports the value of pleasant, 
but it does not support the value of fairness, as this value is not compatible with its essence, the former is. 
But what allows us to have this intuition of value? For Scheler (2001, p. 127), it is the feeling. The feeling 
is the “organ” of the values. Through feelings, it is possible to intuit the order of the heart (Scheler, 2001, p. 356). 
The values and connections between them are intuited by emotional perception at the moment of experience, in 
the acts of preferring and postponing, loving and hating. Values would provoke an emotional state of pleasure 
or displeasure, and such emotional states are then related to the qualities of pleasant and unpleasant.
It is not the reason that takes the lead in this process, and this is one of the reasons why it is not pos-
sible to apply the method of natural sciences to practical knowledge. The reason is amazed by the richness 
of the values, recognizes that each thing has its value, discovers a system of values and appreciates such 
complexity, but is not able to intuit, evidence, apprehend or define them. Therefore, it is not possible to 
define the essence of an ethical value, as they are manifested in the experience of a certain subject. Only as 
phenomena, they can be captured. This does not mean that they depend on the subject. Values do not orig-
inate in the subject. They are experienced by the subject in a similar way to essences. And, like essences, 
they are a priori, universal and necessary (Scheler, 1994).
For Scheler, material (non-formal) a priori is understood in the experience of value, as every experi-
ence already has intrinsic value. An object of perception such as a landscape is not only vast, mountainous, 
1  Em 1991 o livro foi votado em pesquisa feita pela Library of Congress um dos 10 livros mais influentes já escritos. Citado em The 
SAGE Encyclopedia of Theory in Counseling and Psychotherapy, editado por Edward S. Neukrug.
2  Em 2000, no Japão, os leitores do Yomiuru Shimbun, jornal de maior tiragem diária do mundo, listaram o livro de Frankl como um 
dos “10 a serem levados para o século 21”. Viktor Frankl Institute. Disponível em https://www.univie.ac.at/logotherapy/lifeandwork.html
3  Em 05/01/2020 estava por exemplo em 45º lugar na lista de mais vendidos da Amazon Brasil. Disponível em: https://
www.amazon.com.br/gp/bestsellers/books/?ie=UTF8&ref_=sv_b_2.
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grey and green but also pleasant, majestic and beautiful. Historical artifacts carry cultural values beyond 
their value of use, such as the spinning wheel that Gandhi used to spin his fabric or the image of a deity. 
To say that a value accompanies an object does not mean that it is produced by it. The blue color of the 
sky is not present in it, but only in our sensation. Just as the intellect identifies the blue colour, the feeling 
identifies the beauty. The act of valuing is emotional, not intellectual. We “see” the beauty of a painting, just 
as we “see” its colours. The apprehension of value, for Scheler, is our most fundamental relationship with 
the world. An object has value to us before it is perceived or known. Thus, valuing is an act of attributing 
meaning and, therefore, an intentional act (Davis & Steinbock, 2019).
For Scheler, there are two basic feelings, love and hate. These two acts are present in every per-
ception of value. In the act of love, the value of an object or person is highlighted, revealing its deepest 
meaning. In the act of hate, which is a movement of destruction, this value is diminished or degraded. It 
is through these feelings that the world begins to have meaning for us, and we start to prefer it. We are 
attracted to what bears positive value and repelled by what bears negative value. 
Thus, Scheler avoids any relativism. The values and rules that govern their relationships are given; 
they are detected from experiences; they are not based on experience; they are not discovered in an induc-
tive process. Wojtyla comments:
It is about the ethics of what is good or bad, of moral good or evil as such. In this sense, we cannot 
inductively obtain good and evil from empirical data, which is why - as Scheler says - they must 
occur a priori. Scheler, however, does not put this apriorism beyond experience in general, but only 
beyond the experience that constitutes the starting point of the exact sciences (Wojtyla, 1993, p. 17).
It is evident that Scheler (2001), like Husserl, does not define a priori in the same way as Kant. The 
phenomenological a priori is intuited in the experience, not built by understanding; it is transcendent, not 
transcendental and can be material, not exclusively formal. The values and connections between them are 
based on essences. According to Scheler, what can be learned through them is the logos that inform the 
universe.
The proper seat of all a priori estimation (and concretely moral) is the knowledge of value, the intuition 
of value that is based on emotional perception, preferring and, ultimately, loving and hating. As well as 
the intuition of connections that exist between values, between their higher and lower being, is ‘moral 
knowledge’. This knowledge is thus achieved through specific functions and acts that are toto coelo distinct 
from perceiving and thinking, and constitute the only possible access to the realm of values. Values and 
their hierarchy are not manifested through ‘inner perception’ or observation (in which only the psychic is 
given), but in a living and emotional exchange with the universe (whether it is psychic or physical or any 
other), “in preferring and postponing, loving and hating in itself, that is, in the trajectory of execution of 
these intentional acts.” (Scheler, 2001, p. 127. Our translation)
2. Scheler and the Ethics
Ethics is founded on the knowledge of value, which has its own content a priori and its own evidence 
so that the will is directed primarily to the realization of a value given in these acts. And, only while this 
value is given factually in the sphere of moral knowledge, willing is morally clear, a motivated volition (Ca-
dena, 2019), a well-founded decision, unlike “blind” willing, arbitrary volition, capricious impulse. Thus, a 
value can be given when sentimental perceiving and preferring, in the most diverse degrees of adequacy, 
until it reaches the ‘to be given by yourself’, coinciding with the unequivocal evidence. If the value is given, 
the will will be necessary for your being, according to an essential law. “And it is in this sense alone that 
Socrates dictum is restored – that all “good willing” is founded in the “cognition of the good”, and that all 
evil willing rests on moral deception and aberration” (Scheler, 1973, p. 69).
In this way, Scheler separates moral knowledge from theoretical knowledge. Morality has its own 
autonomy, foundation and method, and mainly its own “organ”, the feeling, which is experienced by the 
spirit (Scheler, 2001). This does not mean that feeling and conscience, emotion and cognition, are sepa-
rated in moral action. They have complementary functions because alongside an empirical Ethics there 
is a pure Ethics. The first has as its object the experiences and feelings that give occasion for emotional 
intuition of values. The second studies the values in their pure and hierarchical dimension. In other words, 
feelings are the starting point of moral action and, alongside, theoretical reason remains responsible for 
justification, but it acts ex post. Or even, the experience of the goods gives occasion for the emotional intui-
tion of the values followed by the knowledge of the values. 
The subject in this process is not a mere spectator who experiences and feels, the subject is endowed 
with autonomy, freedom, free will (Seifert, 2011), to perform spiritual acts of decision and judgment. 
Scheler does not give the subject a passive character that only admires the values manifested in the goods. 
Scheler provides the spirit with an active role. The spirit illuminates the values experienced and, in addi-
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tion to feeling, prefers and postpones, loves and hates. And, when he does it according to the hierarchy of 
values, his decision is well founded (Scheler, 1960).
For this reason, human beings are not limited to responding to the stimuli of natural life but can 
be freed from them. They can know things according to their essence and value and formulate different 
hypotheses for the realization of values. The spirit is what distinguishes man from objects and animals. 
It is the cause of his autonomy. In this sense, Gomá states that “man is essentially different from animals 
because above his life and in opposition to it he is constituted by a spirit, whose active centre can be called 
the person” (Gomá, 2003, p. 304). The spirit recognizes values and understands their order, and can find 
different ways to carry them out.
3. Scheler and the Hierarchy of Values
For Scheler, there is a clear difference in value between values. In every experience, this difference 
becomes evident through the phenomenon of preference, which guides our moral acts. This alleged order 
of preference in the experience of goods can be well understood by the act of sacrifice. For example, for the 
sake of health value (vital value), we can sacrifice a pleasurable experience of an excessive amount of food 
(sensitive value). Even if we don't, we know that this is a morally obvious choice. An order of preference for 
values is present in each individual, what Scheler calls ‘an ethos’. In the work Formalism in Ethics, Scheler 
(2001) states that there are four levels in this ‘hierarchy of values’. 
The first includes a series of pleasant and unpleasant. Corresponds to the function of sensitive sen-
timental perception, with its modes, pleasure and suffering; and it corresponds to this series of values 
emotional states of sensitive feelings, pleasure and pain. It is essential to highlight that this series of values 
is not related to human beings, things or concrete processes in the real world. The difference between 
values, even pleasant and unpleasant, is an absolute difference, clearly visible before knowing pleasant or 
unpleasant things. It must be remembered that, for Scheler, values are manifest in things, but they are a 
priori. Thus, what can be “explained” is only the bond between the emotional state and certain impulses of 
action directed to the thing, never the values itself and their order of preference. This application is valid 
regardless of any human organization.
The second level consists in the values of vital sensitivity apprehended by vital sentimental percep-
tion. The values of things in this modality are all those qualities included in the noble-vulgar antithesis. 
These values make up all those values that are located in the sphere of well-being and that are subordi-
nate to the noble and vulgar. And, they accompany the states of vital feeling, for example, ascending and 
descending life, health and illness, old age and death, exhaustion, vigour, joy, affliction, anguish, revenge, 
cholera etc.
In the third are the spiritual values experienced by the axiological sentimental perception guided by 
love and hate. The realm of spiritual values is separated from the body and the ambience, and they are 
manifested as unity. Furthermore, their perception leads to clear evidence that vital values must be sacri-
ficed to them. 
The functions and acts in which they are apprehended are functions of spiritual feeling and acts like-
-named vital functions and acts by pure phenomenological evidence as well as by their own proper 
lawfulness (which cannot be reduced to any “biological” lawfulness) (Scheler, 1973, p. 101).
Here are the aesthetic values like the beauty and the ugliness; the value of pure knowledge of the 
truth, as philosophy and science intend to accomplish; and the practical value of just and unjust, which 
must serve as a basis for an objective legal order, independent of any posit. These values include peculiar 
reactions such as pleasing and displeasing, approving and disapproving, appreciation and contempt, desire 
or revenge, spiritual sympathy, which founds friendship.
And finally, at the highest level, the value of holiness and the profane whose corresponding senti-
mental states are beatitude and despair. The feelings attached to these values are faith and worship, and 
their opposite, unbelief. Such values are shown only on objects that are given in intention as 'absolute 
objects'. "With respect to the saint's values, however, all other values are given as symbols of them" (Scheler, 
2001, p. 178).
The act by which we originally grasp the values of holiness is an act of a particular class of love. They 
are essentially human values, values of people. Only human beings can capture such a sphere of values. In 
the words of Scheler:
In the essence the act is directed toward persons, or toward something of the form of a person being, 
no matter what content or what “conception” of personhood is implied. The self-value in the sphere of 
the values of the “holy” is therefore, by essential necessity, a “value of the person”. (Scheler, 1973, p. 109).
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Scheler (2001) establishes five criteria to describe this hierarchy of values. The highest values are (i) 
the most enduring as the Truth, (ii) the least divisible as Beaty, (iii) the most fundamental or least depen-
dent as in the half-end relationship the half value is derived from the end value as Utility, (iv) those that 
provide greater satisfaction or fulfilment such as Love, and (v) the less relative ones that demand higher 
intentional acts for their realization, such as Justice that derives from a well-founded decision, or agency. 
The experience of higher values provides a greater personal evolution and can be distributed more widely. 
Thus, the human being who recognizes the scale of values and acts by preferring and postponing values in 
order to achieve higher values, has a moral life and gradually improves. What guides the person towards 
the highest values is love, and what drives them away is hate. It is agapic love, active love (Robbins, 2016), 
love that reaches others. At the lowest level are ephemeral values, a source of pleasure and pain. At the top 
of the scale of values are the values that only human beings can grasp, the values of holiness are the most 
enduring. We can represent this hierarchy in the following table:
LEVEL VALUE EMOTIONAL STATE FEELING
Holiness Holiness (profane) Beatitude Faith and despair
Espiritual Love (hate) Sympathy Appreciation and contempt
Vital Nobility (vulgarity) Vigor Health and illness
Sensitive Pleasure (displeasure) Excitement Joy and suffering
Tabela 1
The ethical value of the Good is manifested in the act of realizing higher values, higher in the hier-
archy of values, are the spiritual and holy values. The ethical value of evil, on the contrary, is manifested 
in the act of preferring lower values, lower in the scale of values, vital values and, below all, sensitive. A 
necessary consequence is that the Good is related to the value, not to the thing, or rather, it contributes to 
the achievement of higher values. Although we recognize them and practice acts that carry them out, we 
are not able to define them, only feel them. 
For Scheler, this world of values is not only fully ordered in its objective structure, but also its emo-
tional-cognitive perception on the part of man is distinguished by a specific a priori order. And it 
is an objective order, since pure feeling does not create it among values, but only captures it and 
its arrangement. The order is expressed in a particular structure of correlations and links between 
values. These are, above all, hierarchical relationships; some values are, a priori, superior to others. 
The a priori superiority of some values over others, man perceives emotionally; not only through 
reciprocal discursive comparison but immediately and intuitively. In this way, that pure feeling of 
the values that we alluded to before always assumes the character of pure feeling of the superiority or 
inferiority of a value (Wojtyla, 1993, p. 22).
Scheler says that an integral spiritual life is not reduced to knowing and thinking objectives, but also 
includes pure acts and laws of acts, which are independent in their essence and content from all human 
organization. Even the emotional part of the spirit, feeling, preferring, loving, hating and wanting have 
a primordial content a priori, which is not offered by thinking, and which Ethics must show regardless of 
Logic. "There is an order of the heart or logic of the heart, as Blase Pascal says, which are a priori" (Scheler, 
2001, p. 121).
This hierarchy of values, or rather, the superiority of a value, is given to us by preferring. However, 
even though the superiority of a value is given in the act of preferring, that superiority is an inherent 
relation to the essence of the same values. For this reason, it is absolutely invariable, although the rules 
of preference may vary throughout history (Scheler, 2001). Therefore, one should not confuse preferring 
with choosing or any act of tendency. This trend must be based on the knowledge of the superiority of 
value. Besides, a distinction must be made between preferring and achieving. The act of preferring can be 
conscious and accompanied by reflection between various values given to the feeling, but it can also occur 
completely automatically, as in an intuitive preferring. 
It is in the experience of preference for value that Scheler clarifies the a priori sense of his Ethics. To 
claim that there is an objective order of values (an Ordo Amoris) implies that we must act in a way that pro-
motes higher or positive values. But these values, material and a priori, although they are not given before 
the experience and are only revealed during the experiences of the goods, have a hierarchical order that 
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does not depend on the experience (Scheler, 2012). Thus, a masterpiece by Leonardo is not only considered 
beautiful but also preferable to merely vital. As Davis & Steinbock (2019) said, “A cow certainly has a dif-
ferent value for the Hindu and for the farmer. However, that sacred should be preferred to the vital is not 
historically or culturally relative”.
4. Scheler and the Idea of Person 
For Scheler (1960), as well as for Husserl (HUA I), the great task of philosophy is the investigation 
of human nature. In a published study About the idea of man, Scheler (1960) recognises some distinct un-
derstandings of human beings: (i) the homo creatus a creature in the image and likeness of God; (ii) homo 
sapiens, zoon logikon, anima rationalis a being endowed with reason capable of knowing being, the world and 
himself, give meaning, creating art and culture; (iii) homo naturalis a continuation of animals and without a 
specific natural quality and unit that distinguishes it; (iv) homo fabris a being able to manufacture tools and 
whose reason and logic were recently formed due to their occupations; among others.
On the one hand, Scheler vehemently rejects the definitions of human beings as homo naturalis and 
homo fabris, and also the idea of 'Dionysian man', since they intend to nullify spirit and reason (Scheler, 
1960). It also criticizes the reductionisms that comprise the human being as a result of economic relations, 
of nature and its instincts, or of history and political powers. 
On the other hand, Scheler positively highlights the understanding of human beings as endowed 
with reason and reinforces the function of reason that “from Plato to the Stoics: human reason as a partial 
function (later as a 'creature') of the divine who has the strength of ideas and that constantly produces the 
world and its ordering - not in the sense of a creation, but of an eternal “move and capture” (Scheler, 1960, 
p. 81). Still in this sense, he points out four common notes in the anthropology of several philosophers of 
the Western tradition (Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Malebranche and 
even Hegel): (i) man carries within himself a divine agent, (ii) this divine agent identifies himself ontologi-
cally and is able to know the world, (iii) this agent - logos - has the power to realize ideal contents, (iv) this 
agent is absolutely constant in history. However, it still considers the understanding of human beings as 
homo sapiens too narrow. 
Scheler (1994) agrees with the Husserlian distinction between empirical and transcendental ego. The 
subject is unique, but with two different dimensions, inseparable and necessary. On the one hand, the ego 
is part of the world, it is material, physical and psychic, it is in space and it lasts in time, it is the empirical 
ego. On the other hand, it is the pole to which objects manifest, it exists before the world, it is spiritual, it 
gives meaning and judges, it is a transcendental ego.
In the sphere of the empirical ego, acts are bodily or psychic. Body acts are sensory perceptions 
and general physiological needs, such as seeing and breathing. Psychic acts are reactions, impulses and 
instincts, like emotions. These are acts of the empirical ego, uncontrolled. In the sphere of the transcenden-
tal ego, acts are spiritual, such as thinking, reflecting, meditating, deciding, valuing, judging, controlling, 
understanding, reasoning, etc., and these are controlled acts. The transcendental (or spiritual) sphere is a 
human attribute; it is the domain of knowledge and virtue. It is in the transcendental sphere that the ego 
is an agent of reason and truth, of freedom and values. The human being, besides being a biological and 
psychological being, is also a spiritual being, capable of abstracting universals, acting according to values 
and aiming at ends, acting responsibly.
Therefore, the human being is a unit with three dimensions: body-psyche-spirit. Even when the hu-
man being has not yet developed the spiritual sphere (for example, he is a child), or has this damaged 
dimension (for example, is in a coma), he has it in potency. There is a universal structure common to all 
human beings (Munárriz, 2007). In other words, this spiritual equality is in potency, not in act. It is not 
necessary to be in full enjoyment of the mental faculties to be human. 
In Essence and forms of sympathy, Scheler (2004) proposes a vision of the human being that evolves ac-
cording to three levels: at the lowest level, there are individuals who dedicate themselves to sensory values 
linked to feelings of pleasure and pain; at the intermediate level, there are those who prefer affective val-
ues, linked to emotions, called vital values that make up the psyque order; at the highest level, the spiritual 
level, are the people who realize spiritual and sacred values. This distinction would be inherited by Frankl 
to refer to what he considered to be the two schools of psychiatry that arose before him, as we will see.
Consistently, freedom also has degrees (Scheler, 1960), both at different stages of a person's life, and 
between different people. As Scheler explains, “Freedom is the determination for a lived relationship be-
tween higher and more amechanical causality with lower and mechanical ones” (Scheler, 1960, p. 18). Hu-
man beings are the amechanical causes, capable of intuiting essences, acting toward values and according 
to ends. This is what makes human actions stable and predictable, freedom is the source of stability, not 
chaos. For Scheler, as for Husserl (HUA IX), human beings are endowed with freedom, freedom under-
stood as autonomy. Human beings are free because they are spiritual beings. Spiritual beings are able to 
intuitively sense values, understand their hierarchy and act accordingly, a motivated volition. What is the 
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highest value? The holyness intuited by a certain class of love. In the sphere of the values of the holyness, 
by essential necessity, it is the ‘value of the person’.
The value of the person (Velasco, 2009) is superior to all value of things (goods), all values are sub-
ordinate to personal values, because the value of the person is rooted in a being, an individual being. The 
person, being endowed with self-awareness and freedom, is able to discover values in other microcosms. 
In other words, human beings support the value of holiness, emotionally intuit this value, understand their 
position in the hierarchy of values and are able to act towards the realization and protection of the value 
of the holiness incarnated in people. 
5. Frankl and the Spiritual Motivation of Human Action 
Until Viktor Frankl's work appeared, psychology had only offered reactive models of human moti-
vation. Basically, the families of motivation theories were instinctual, homeostatic and Maslow's (1954) 
theory of the hierarchy of needs. In common with all of them, the idea that what drives the Human Being 
is the need or the scarcity.
'Motivation' (motor of action) can be defined as the psychological characteristic that impels the or-
ganism to act towards a goal, giving purpose and direction to the behaviour. 'Need', on the other hand, 
could be defined as a psychological demand that, if not satisfied, generates displeasure, and if it remains 
unsatisfied for long enough, leads to death or illness. Although Psychology often treats them as synonyms, 
they are certainly distinct, non-coextensive concepts. 
Instinct theories are theories of necessity. Instinct would be an innate impulse to make a specific 
response to a given stimulus, universal in the species (or in a genus of that species). In some way that we 
do not yet know, it would be the result of adaptive advantages of this determined behaviour for the species 
throughout the evolutionary process. The instinctive impulse would be felt passively by the subject, who 
would only be able to give in or resist, when possible, at the cost of great psychological suffering. The con-
tinued suppression of instincts such as procreation would lead to psychic illness, and breathing, to death.
Homeostatic models of motivation show that certain motivations are somatic impulses in order to 
reduce or eliminate the imbalance of a biologically programmed system. Examples of homeostatic systems 
are hunger, thirst and sleep. Although many known motivations do not follow this model, its existence 
seems indisputable. It is also a necessary motivation: if the somatic balance in question (water level, glu-
cose or sleep) is not recovered, psychological distress is extreme, and death is certain.
The contrast between the positive hierarchy of Scheler's values and the hierarchy of needs in Maslow's 
theory is illustrative enough to understand the nature of the change proposed by Frankl. For Maslow, all 
motivation is a necessity, and there are needs more potent than others, which, if not met, mobilize our 
psychic forces to a higher degree. If we are hungry, our priority is to satisfy it, and not get the esteem of a 
colleague, for example. This hierarchy would be universal in species, but in practice, the order in the hier-
archy is difficult to establish experimentally and seems to be easily subverted.
All of these theories of motivation are theories of disability: giving vent to an impulse, regaining lost 
balance, satisfying a need. Frankl proposes a theory of positive motivation, which does not aim at elim-
inating a deficiency or need, but at achieving meaning and value. He inherits from Scheler not only the 
concept of value and its hierarchy but finds in it a guide to his anthropological vision.
In Logotherapy (Frankl, 1993) - sense therapy - it is considered that a good part of our psychic ill-
nesses are caused not by an unsatisfied need or instinct, but by the frustration of a meaningless life. There 
is no denying of the existence of disability motivations, but their exclusivity. You cannot be fully healthy 
and happy by merely healing needs but only by realizing values and meaning positively. 
Frankl (1993) liked to designate his Existential Analysis as the Third Viennese School of Psychotherapy, 
a name that evidenced its connection with Freudian and Adlerian psychoanalysis without implying, 
however, an adhesion (Morgan, 1983). In this sense, Dominguez (2011) warns that these views suffer 
from blindness in values and the spiritual dimension of human beings. For this reason, Frankl com-
bined this understanding with the Schelerian view of human beings presented in Essence and forms of 
sympathy (Scheler, 2004). For Scheler, human beings evolve according to three levels: (i) at the lowest 
are individuals who dedicate themselves to sensory values linked to feelings of pleasure and pain, (ii) at 
the intermediate level are those who prefer affective values linked to emotions, called vital values that 
make up the order of the psyche, finally, (iii) the highest level, the spiritual level, where are the people 
who realize spiritual and holy values. 
In this sense, Frankl (1978) does not deny the Freudian psychobiological unconscious, which impels 
the human being to the satisfaction of libidinal demands, presenting pleasure as the motivational princi-
ple. View compatible with Scheler's classification of ‘sensitive man’ as the individual who guides his life 
predominantly by this type of motivation.
Nor did he deny individual Adlerian psychology, which argues that overcoming a basic feeling of in-
feriority, the inferiority complex, imposes itself over pleasure as the main motivational source: the search 
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for health and power. He considered the person primarily oriented by this type of motivation to be Schel-
er's ‘vital man’. However, he said in a famous image: 
Of course, an aeroplane is still an aeroplane, even if it only moves on the ground: it can, and more, 
must move again and continuously on the ground! But the fact that it is an aeroplane is only demons-
trated when it rises through the air. In a similar way, a man begins to behave like a man only if he 
can leave the plane of the psychophysical-organismic facticity and can go to meet himself, without 
having to confront himself. 
This power is what it means to exist and to exist means: to be above yourself always (Frankl, 1994, 
p. 78).  
Likewise, the human being when living under the will to pleasure and the will to power does not 
realize his particular nature. For Frankl, there is a third source of motivation for human actions: the 
will (Willkür) to meaning, typical of the spiritual dimension, here in the same sense that Scheler gave to 
the term. The human being is the only animal that has had the most unnatural questions since its earliest 
childhood, it is the only animal that asks: 'Why?', 'What is this in essence?'. And mainly, 'I exist, suffer, and 
what will I die for? '.
6. Frankl and Meaning
These kinds of questions about the ultimate nature of reality and the ultimate meaning of existence 
for Frankl are not neurotic symptoms as Freud wanted, but manifestations of a spiritual dimension of the 
human being. For Logotherapy, the key to mental health in this dimension is the experience of meaning, 
of value in life.
Because every meaning of life can only be found in the search, realization and experience of values, 
it only makes sense what has intrinsic value, not derivative, what is worth in itself, and not for what it can 
give (utility). When the human being fails to find real meaning, to be experienced in his existence, he loses 
his enthusiasm for work, for social relations, and all pleasure and power seem tasteless. It is what Frankl 
calls an ‘existential void’ or ‘noogenic neurosis’ (Frankl, 1993).
Frankl (1973) is explicit in attributing to Scheler and his study on the "bourgeois man" (Scheler, 
2012), the origin of his concept of ‘noogenic neurosis’ (or its nickname, ‘Sunday neurosis’). It would be a 
consequence of a life lived to realize and accumulate means of achieving values  (such as power and materi-
al goods), and not values  in themselves, which are the goal of the healthy psyche. It is this category of men, 
says Frankl, that - once reaching some stability and professional security, working hard all week - are 
taken on Sundays by a feeling of emptiness in their lives, tending to take refuge in some drug like alcohol. 
This is what he called horror vacui.
Following Scheler, Frankl argues that the realization of meaning depends on the person and the sit-
uation in which he finds himself; however, the meaning is objective, not subjective. For example, in a given 
configuration of a chess game, the move that makes the most sense in a given round is often determined 
objectively by the configuration of the pieces, although it changes with each round.
The meaning of life, or the various meanings of life in everyday life, is found objectively in action 
that, in concrete, unrepeatable situations, allows the realization of the highest possible value. The mission 
of our conscience is to discover the situation or the meaning that is being presented. It is a unique and 
"exclusive possibility of a concrete person in his concrete situation, a possibility that Max Scheler some-
how tries to designate with the concept of 'situation values'" (Frankl, 1992, p. 27). This mission for Frankl 
is always something individual, a 'must-be' that cannot be determined by any general law or rationally 
knowable, but only captivated by consciousness intuitively by the organ of value that is the feeling.
Thus, the meaning of life, or the mission, not only varies from individual to individual, given its 
unique and irreplaceable character but also differs from moment to moment. Quoting Scheler again, 
Frankl recalls that it is not a question of denying eternal values, but remembering that these small oppor-
tunities to fulfil them, in specific contexts, are situational (situation values). These values await their time 
to happen and have the chance to be performed only once. If the opportunity is lost, then that ‘situation 
value’ (Frankl, 1973) is lost forever.
The greatest opportunity to realize higher values is the realization of the meaning of life. This reali-
zation is not a matter of need, lack, or a question of what life has to give you. Rather, is a question of what 
you have to give to life. What could no one else do for me in this world? This is a fundamental question to 
find personal meaning for life. For Frankl (1993), it can be discovered in three basic ways: doing a work, 
loving someone or something or suffering for something more important than life itself.
Another issue to remember here is that throughout life we will always have conflicts between values 
to be realized (it can be between the beautiful and the sacred, or the just and the true, or the vital and the 
pleasurable, and so on.) Frankl (1973) follows Scheler in the belief that these values are "immeasurable" 
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(p. 309), so they cannot be compared. While some conflicts are easy to resolve, such as between values of 
different orders, conflicts between values of the same hierarchical order (such as love and truth, justice and 
beauty or health and joy) can cause a lot of psychological suffering. It is the psychotherapist's job to help 
people clarify the conflict of values behind the concrete conflict.
Finally, it may still be useful here to remember that, following this concept of the meaning of life, 
Frankl also elaborates his concept of what would be the feeling of ‘faith’, which would lead to the state that 
Scheler calls “beatitude”. He calls it ‘Supra-sense’: a feeling of unconditional meaning in life, which would 
save its transience from meaninglessness.
7. Frankl and the Spiritual Unconscious
For Frankl, our unconscious is not only a source of libidinal pulsation of somatic origin but also the 
person's thirst, source of actions and intuition of value. Frankl (1992) says: "The unconscious is composed 
not only of instinctive elements, but also spiritual" (p. 18). For psychoanalysis or a man seeks a gratifica-
tion, but for good therapy, there is no act of putting a direction on something, a value. Unlike the homeo-
static systems of motivation, the Franklian human being model considers that human psychic health is a 
state of tension between who is and who should be. We have natural and unconscious intuitions not only 
for pleasure and health but for love, for justice, for truth, for beauty and also for the sacred. When we stop 
looking for a realization or realization of these intuitions, we also become neurotic.
This spiritual dimension, the values  dimension, was essentially different from the psychological di-
mension. Existence, Frankl thought, is always thoughtless, as it cannot be the object of reflection. The real 
deep, spiritual person is always unconscious (Frankl, 1992). The meaning of this statement is that the spir-
itual execution of the acts and, consequently, the personal entity as the spiritual centre of these acts, is pure 
execution that does not reflect on itself. It is a variation on Brentano's claim that consciousness is always 
the awareness of something other than itself. The executing self is always different from what is executed. 
He illustrates his idea of  a profound person, the centre of spiritual acts, unconscious, with the metaphor 
of  the eye. Like an eye does not see itself and has its 'blind spot' on the retina, so the spirit, exactly where it 
has its origin, is blind to itself. Frankl quotes the Vedas to illustrate the point "What he sees cannot be seen, 
what he hears cannot be heard, what he thinks cannot be thought" (1992, p. 30-31).
To defend this idea, Frankl again uses the way Scheler defines ‘person’, as a carrier or support for 
spiritual acts, but also as a centre and creative source of them. Since that is where spiritual acts come 
from, it is also that around which all psychophysicists are grouped. But the person has a psychophysical 
element, and it is his spiritual dimension. Therefore, not all feelings originate in the spiritual unconscious 
for Frankl. Using Scheler again, he distinguishes between ‘feeling of state’, ‘affective state’ and ‘intentional 
feeling’. The latter he considers to be typical of the unconscious, but not the first two, which are at the same 
stage as instincts and impulsive states.
However, the spiritual unconscious would not act only at the origin of the psyche. It is present not only 
in the deepest but also in the most subtle and highest. As a prime example of this, Frankl (1992) cites his own 
ability to decide, during sleep, between remaining unconscious or waking up. There is some instance deciding 
whether the person who dreams should stay asleep or wake up, facing a noise that must be judged as a threat 
or the cry of a child. As Frankl recalls, a mother may wake up due to a small disturbance in her newborn son's 
breathing rhythm, but remain entirely indifferent to the loud noises coming out of the street. This same state 
is felt in hypnosis, where the subject leaves the state as soon as something he does not want to happen. What 
decides whether something becomes conscious or remains unconscious, differentiates and judges in some 
way. Deciding, differentiating and judging are spiritual acts. In this sense, Frankl argues that the spiritual can 
not only be unconscious, but must also, both in its last resort and in its origin, be unconscious.
Conclusion
Frankl built a psychotherapeutic model based primarily on Scheler's theory of values and anthropol-
ogy. In doing so, it offered not only a psychotherapy and psychopathology of values, but also a new theory 
of human motivation that did not conceive it as exclusively the result of needs and needs, but the free spirit 
directed towards positive and objective values. The search for meaning and value is a kind of human mo-
tivation that is not born from lack, but from Willkür oriented towards higher, spiritual and sacred values.
This conception, as we saw here, was practically all inherited from Scheler, who based on a phenom-
enological approach, proposed a description of human motivation directed to the existence of objective 
values emotionally intuited in the experience and understood by the conscience. Evidently, this type of ap-
proach to human motivation is beyond the possibility of experimental investigation. This does not mean, 
however, that we do not know how to be intuitively obvious that we seek the good, the beautiful, the true 
and the fair without any need to supply a need.
Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences   |   Vol. 1-1 2020   |   111-120
120
PHS Phenomenology, Humanities and SciencesFenomenologia, Humanidades e Ciências
References
Cadena, N. (2019). Scheler e o problema do livre arbítrio. In Roberto S. Kahlmeyer-Mertens, Katyana M. Weyh, 
Eduardo H.S. Kisse, Marcelo R. Silva & José Dias (Orgs). Studium Max Scheler: novas recepções, vol. II. Ed. 
E-book (pp. 215-252). Toledo: Vivens. http://www.humanitasvivens.com.br/livro.php?id=349
Davis, Z. & Steinbock, A. (2019). “Max Scheler”, In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2019 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/scheler/
Domínguez, X (2011). Psicología de la persona. Madrid: Palabra.
Frankl, V. E. (1973). Psicoterapia e Sentido da Vida. São Paulo: Editora Quadrante.
Frankl, V. E. (1978). Fundamentos antropológicos da psicoterapia. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores.
Frankl, V. E. (1991). Em busca de sentido: um psicólogo no campo de concentração. Petrópolis: Vozes. 
Frankl, V. E. (1992). A Presença Ignorada de Deus. Petrópolis: Vozes.
Frankl, V. E. (1993). Em Busca de Sentido. Petrópolis: Editora Vozes.
Frankl, V. E. (1994). Logoterapia y análisis existencial. Barcelona: Herder.
Goma, F. (2003). Scheler y la ética de los valores. In Victoria Camps, ed. Historia de la ética - La ética contem-
poránea. Vol. 3 (p. 297-326). Barcelona: Editorial Crítica.
Husserl, E. (1985). Meditaciones Cartesianas. Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Económica (HUA I).
Husserl, E. (1998). Invitación a la fenomenología. La filosofía como autorreflexión de la humanidad. Barcelona: Univer-
sidad Autónoma de Barcelona (HUA IX).
Husserl, E. (2007). Investigações Lógicas. Segundo volume, parte I: Investigações para a Fenomenologia e a Teoria do Co-
nhecimento. Lisboa: Centro de Filosofia de Lisboa (HUA XIX/1).
Maslow, A. H. (1954). Motivation and personality. New York: Harper and Row.
Morgan, J. (1983). Personal Meaning as Therapy: The Roots and Branches of Frankl’s Psychology. Pastoral Psy-
chology, 31 (3), 184-192.
Munárriz, L. (2007). Persona y Sustancia en la Filosofía de Max Scheler. Anuario Filosófico, 10 (1): 9-26.
Perrin, R. (1991). Max Scheler’s concept of the person, an Ethics of Humanism. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Robbins, B. (2016). The Heart of Humanistic Psychology: Human Dignity Disclosed Through a Hermeneutic of 
Love. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 56 (3), 223-237.
Scheler, M. (1960). Metafísica de la Libertad. [Phaenomenologie und Metaphysik der Freiheit]. Buenos Aires: Editorial 
Nova.
Scheler, M. (1994). El puesto del hombre en el cosmos. Buenos Aires: Editora Losada.
Scheler, M. (2001). Ética – Nuevo ensayo de fundamentación de un personalismo ético. Madrid: Caparros Editores.
Scheler, M. (1973). Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
Scheler, M. (2004). Esencia y formas de la simpatía. Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada.
Scheler, M. (2012). Da Reviravolta dos valores: ensaios e artigos. Petrópolis: Editora Vozes.
Scheler, M. (2012). Ordo Amoris. Covilhã: Universidade da Beira Interior/Lusosofia. http://www.lusosofia.net/
textos/scheler_ordo_amoris.pdf 
Seifert, J. (2011). In Defense of Free Will: a Critique of Benjamin Libet. The Review of Metaphysics, 65 (2), 377-307.
Velasco, F. (2009). La persona: valor y amor en la filosofía de Max Scheler. Análisis, 74, pp. 71-94.
Wojtyla, K. (1993). Max Scheler e a ética cristã. Curitiba: Champagnat.
Submitted Jan 14, 2020 – Accepted Mar 14, 2020
Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences   |   Vol. 1-1 2020   |   111-120
